

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Copied to Mr. Thompson
by Mr. Smith*

November 7, 1962

To: William H. Brubeck

From: Bromley Smith

Will you please see that Ambassador Thompson is provided with a copy of the attached. Any additional distribution within the Department should be in accordance with Ambassador Thompson's instruction. He also has a copy of the Khrushchev letter of November 5.

DRAFT

11/6/62

(dictated by Captain Shepard)

Dear Mr. Chairman

I received your recent letter and I wish to give you as fully as possible the strong feelings we have about the matter here.

In the first place, I need not tell you of the profound shock which recent events have provided to relations between our two countries.

You may state, as Mr. Kuznetsov stated yesterday to Mr. McCloy,

that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any

activities it was carrying on in a third country. I ^{cannot} ~~do not~~ accept

this view, nor would you if the activities being carried on in a third

country were intended to alter the balance of power in the world

upon which our present uneasy peace so much depends. The fact

of the matter, however, is not only were we not informed of events

in a third country, but active steps were taken to misinform us about

what was being done.

I am not now referring to the TASS article of September but to the communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential communications from the highest levels of your government. Through these channels ^{we} were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba, which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. ^{Assurance} Believing that those represented a commitment which would be met, I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were warning us of the trend of events in Cuba. Then the undeniable evidence that offensive weapons were [The fact that my government misjudged the course of events in Cuba being installed was a deep and dangerous shock first has given a most profound shock to my country.] to our government and then to our whole people. Let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if there had been set up in Finland, a government of increasing hostility to you, ^{if} ^{as even in Sweden} and then during the comparatively brief period, ^{and private} while public reassurances were being given, as there had been

-3- ^{an action from our side. And that}
is how ^{the} ~~your~~ action of your side in
Cuba appears to us,

Finland

clandestinely sent to Cuba a whole variety of dangerous means

^{destruction}
of ~~construction~~ which had been belatedly discovered, ^{you know how the} ~~you can have~~
^{Government +}
Soviet people would have reacted to such
~~some idea of the feeling in this country.~~ Now why then am I so

persistent in wanting this matter settled quickly and completely?

First, because ~~in some measure~~ I believe it vital that we reestablish
^{some}
a measure of confidence and communication between you and me. If
^{leaders of the}
the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with ^{some accuracy} ~~precision~~ the intention,
^{each} ^{we shall face}
of the other, ~~this will mean~~ an increasingly dangerous period for the
~~two of us.~~

^{you}
Secondly, in return for the commitments of yours I gave certain
^{in particular a commitment that}
commitments on behalf of the United States, ~~among them that we~~
^{which has already}
would not invade Cuba. This commitment ~~has~~ been under attack,
^{an} ^{by a}
~~and~~ will become increasingly the object of criticism ~~by~~ ^{by a} great many
of my countrymen. If after all we have gone through there ~~remains~~

~~It can only be kept if the~~ It

including Soviet-manned

^{remains} ~~or leaves~~ ^{a Soviet} in Cuba ^A military bases which could quickly become offensive ^A

SAM sites, ~~heavy aircraft~~, large numbers of technicians, jet

^{and} bombers, with a possibility that mobile missiles bases could quickly

be introduced. Combined with these facts is Castro's opposition to

UN on-the-ground-inspection and announced opposition to air

reconnaissance which at present gives us some degree of security.

Under these conditions, even though the missiles might be withdrawn

if the SAM sites remain, if the bombers remain, if a fishing harbor

is constructed which could submarines, if Russian

technicians remain, if the Cubans object to air surveillance, use

SAM missiles against it and refuse to agree to on-the-ground inspection

then the whole threat could rise again in the period of a comparatively

few days and we would once again be faced with dangerous events.

Already we have reports of missiles being hidden in caves, although

I accept your word that they are not; of carriers and other